7744 | Forums / Theology Forum / Catholic Apologists | on: March 10, 2007, 06:01:23 AM |
When we say that God is infinite, we mean
that He is unlimited in every kind of perfection or that every
conceivable perfection belongs to Him in the highest conceivable way. In
a different sense we sometimes speak, for instance, of infinite time or
space, meaning thereby time of such indefinite duration or space of
such indefinite extension that we cannot assign any fixed limit to one
or the other. Care should be taken not to confound these two essentially
different meanings of the term. Time and space, being made up of parts
in duration or extension, are essentially finite by comparison with
God's infinity. Now we assert that God is infinitely perfect in the
sense explained, and that His infinity is deducible from His
self-existence. For a self-existent being, if limited at all, could be
limited only by itself; to be limited by another would imply causal
dependence on that other, which the very notion of self-existence
excludes. But the self-existing cannot be conceived as limiting itself,
in the sense of curtailing its perfection of being, without ceasing to
be self-existing. Whatever it is, it is necessarily; its own essence is
the sole reason or explanation of its existence, so that its manner of
existence must be as unchangeable as its essence, and to suggest the
possibility of an increase or diminution of perfection would be to
suggest the absurdity of a changeable essence. It only remains, then, to
say that whatever perfection is compatible with its essence is actually
realized in a self-existing being; but as there is no conceivable
perfection as such -- that is, no expression of positive being as such
-- that is not compatible with the essence of the self-existent, it
follows that the self-existent must be infinite in all perfection. For
self-existence itself is absolute positive being and positive being
cannot contradict, and cannot therefore limit, positive being.
This general, and admittedly very abstract, conclusion, as well as the reasoning which supports it, will be rendered more intelligible by a brief specific illustration of what it involves. (i) When, in speaking of the Infinite, we attribute all conceivable perfections to Him, we must not forget that the predicates we employ to describe perfections derive their meaning and connotation in the first instance from their application to finite beings; and on reflection it is seen that we must distinguish between different kinds of perfections, and that we cannot without palpable contradiction attribute all the perfections of creatures in the same way to God. Some perfections are such that even in the abstract, they necessarily imply or connote finiteness of being or imperfection; while some others do not of themselves necessarily connote imperfection. To the first class belong all material perfections -- extension, sensibility and the like -- and certain spiritual perfections such as rationality (as distinct from simple intelligence); to the second class belong such perfections as being truth, goodness, intelligence, wisdom, justice, holiness, etc. Now while it cannot be said that God is infinitely extended, or that He feels or reasons in an infinite way, it can be said that He is infinitely good, intelligent, wise, just, holy, etc. -- in other words, while perfections of the second class are attributed to God formally (i.e., without any change in the proper meaning of the predicates which express them), those of the first class can only be attributed to Him eminently and equivalently, (i.e. whatever positive being they express belongs to God as their cause in a much higher and more excellent way than to the creatures in which they formally exist). By means of this important distinction, which Agnostics reject or neglect, we are able to think and to speak of the Infinite without being guilty of contradiction, and the fact that men generally -- even Agnostics themselves when off their guard -- recognize and use the distinction, is the best proof that it is pertinent and well founded. Ultimately it is only another way of saying that, given an infinite cause and finite effects, whatever pure perfection is discovered in the effects must first exist in the cause (via affirmationis) and at the same time that whatever imperfection is discovered in the effects must be excluded from the cause (via negationis vel exclusionis). These two principles do not contradict, but only balance and correct one another. (ii) Yet sometimes men are led by a natural tendency to think and speak of God as if He were a magnified creature -- more especially a magnified man -- and this is known as anthropomorphism. Thus God is said to see or hear, as if He had physical organs, or to be angry or sorry, as if subject to human passions: and this perfectly legitimate and more or less unavoidable use of metaphor is often quite unfairly alleged to prove that the strictly Infinite is unthinkable and unknowable, and that it is really a finite anthropomorphic God that men worship. But whatever truth there may be in this charge as applied to Polytheistic religions, or even to the Theistic beliefs of rude and uncultured minds, it is untrue and unjust when directed against philosophical Theism. The same reasons that justify and recommend the use of metaphorical language in other connections justify and recommended it here, but no Theist of average intelligence ever thinks of understanding literally the metaphors he applies, or hears applied by others, to God, any more than he means to speak literally when he calls a brave man a lion, or a cunning one a fox. (iii) Finally it should be observed that, while predicating pure perfections literally both of God and of creatures, it is always understood that these predicates are true in an infinitely higher sense of God than of creatures, and that there is no thought of coordinating or classifying God with creatures. This is technically expressed by saying that all our knowledge of God is analogical, and that all predicates applied to God and to creatures are used analogically, not univocally. I may look at a portrait or at its living original, and say of either, with literal truth, that is a beautiful face. And this is an example of analogical predication. Beauty is literally and truly realized both in the portrait and its living original, and retains its proper meaning as applied to either; there is sufficient likeness or analogy to justify literal predication but there is not that perfect likeness or identity between painted and living beauty which univocal predication would imply. And similarly in the case of God and creatures. What we contemplate directly is the portrait of Him painted, so to speak, by Himself on the canvas of the universe and exhibiting in a finite degree various perfections, which, without losing their proper meaning for us, are seen to be capable of being realized in an infinite degree; and our reason compels us to infer that they must be and are so realized in Him who is their ultimate cause. Hence we admit, in conclusion, that our knowledge of the Infinite is inadequate, and necessarily so since our minds are only finite. But this is very different from the Agnostic contention that the Infinite is altogether unknowable, and that the statements of Theists regarding the nature and attributes of God are so many plain contradictions. It is only by ignoring the well-recognized rules of predication that have just been explained, and consequently by misunderstanding and misrepresenting the Theistic position, that Agnostics succeed in giving an air of superficial plausibility to their own philosophy of blank negation. Anyone who understands those rules, and has learned to think clearly, and trusts his own reason and common sense, will find it easy to meet and refute Agnostic arguments, most of which, in principle, have been anticipated in what precedes. Only one general observation need be made here -- that the principles to which the Agnostic philosopher must appeal in his attempt to invalidate religious knowledge would, if consistently applied, invalidate all human knowledge and lead to universal scepticism -- and it is safe to say that, unless absolute scepticism becomes the philosophy of mankind, Agnosticism will never supplant religion. T Aquianas Heres my problem with this. I do not doubt that reason plays an important part in understanding revealed truth. But reason is not the supreme cause of understanding revealed truth. Reason may be a secondary cause, but really in this day and age secondary cause are not really put into their proper perspective with all of the Agnostic thinking and the lack of care taken on looking at what the scripture says about the soul of man and the various faculties in how they interact in the cause and effect paradigm. There is a distinction here that needs to be shouted from the house tops. These areas of divine understanding are gifts to man by grace. Any reasoning powers as causes of understanding divine knowledge are not from our rational abilities but are strictly from the recreated order of regeneration. What reason we bring to the table is only corrupted. All our understanding of God come to us as revealed ,that is revealing Christ to us. That knowledge is the good in our reasoning that alone belongs to Christ so that He gets all of the glory for us having an understanding of any divine knowledge. |
Saturday, August 4, 2018
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